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Like two heavyweight boxers exchanging punches, but neither landing the knock-
out blow, Kantians and Hegelians seem to be in a stand-off on what in 
contemporary parlance is known as the Empty Formalism Objection. Kant’s ethics 
is charged with being merely formal and thereby failing to provide the kind of 
specific guidance that any defensible ethical system should have the resources to 
provide. Hegel is often credited with having formulated this objection in its most 
incisive way, and a wealth of Kantian responses has been deployed to answer it. In 
this paper, I take up the objection as it appears in §135R of Elements of the 
Philosophy of Right in order to scrutinise the contemporary debate between the two 
camps. I propose that there are, in fact, three different, albeit connected objections 
and examine (what I take to be) the best Kantian replies to them. I will not 
adjudicate which of these replies is the most accurate interpretation of Kant’s texts, 
nor trace the particular historical context in which Hegel takes up Kant’s ethics, 
nor the way the Empty Formalism Objection fits into Hegel’s wider system. This is 
partly because of constraints of space, and partly because many of the 
contemporary Kantian replies — for better or for worse — treat the Empty 
Formalism Objection as a self-standing philosophical problem, irrespective of its 
historical context or systematic place in Hegel’s theory. My limited aim here is to 
show that, even if one grants — for argument’s sake — the legitimacy of such a non-
contextual approach, significant difficulties remain.  
 
I. Empty Formalism in the Philosophy of Right 
 
What we now call the Empty Formalism Objection finds, perhaps, its most pithy 
statement in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, about mid-way through the discussion of 
‘Moralität’ (3rd Section, ‘The Good and Conscience’). I will concentrate here on this 
statement, drawing on the rest of the book and Hegel’s other works only when 
necessary.  
 Still, some minimal textual contextualisation of the Empty Formalism 
Objection within the Philosophy of Right is in order. Hegel’s argument is at a point 
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where it has been suggested that the good provides an objective standard by which 
the will should be guided (see §133). Specifically, the will faces the good as an 
obligation or duty (Pflicht) which we are meant to obey for its own sake, since the 
good here is contrasted to all specific determinations of the will which have proved 
unsuitable guides for genuinely free willing in the preceding discussion and, hence, 
what remains is only the general abstract essence of goodness that we ought to 
respect as such. The question then becomes what this means concretely for our 
conduct (see §134). Here a problem arises: we require specific guidance in the form 
of detailed, substantial instructions and ends to orientate our wills in concrete 
situations, but such specific guidance is not contained in the mere idea of duty for 
duty’s sake, and presumably can also not be derived from it (see §135). It is not that 
we have no idea at all what these instructions or ends could be — presumably 
drawing on the earlier discussion of abstract right and welfare, Hegel suggests that 
we should do what is right and work for the happiness of ourselves and others (see 
§134). Rather, the point is that even such abstract and general guidance as this 
cannot be derived and is not contained in the idea of duty for duty’s sake; never 
mind the more specific guidance we need. Hence, this idea lacks any content and 
consists merely in an empty identity, forcing people to turn to their conscience for 
any specific guidance, which, however, has pitfalls of its own (which Hegel then 
goes on to discuss; see §§136-140; see also §141). 
 It is in this context that Hegel, in the remark to §135, turns to his critique of 
Kant’s moral philosophy. He begins the remark by praising Kant: specifically, he 
credits him with having introduced the idea of autonomy, that is, the idea that 
morality requires the ability not just to reflect on and choose among one’s 
impulses, inclinations, and desires (what Kant calls ‘negative freedom’), but also the 
ability to be motivated by pure practical reason alone — in short, to act on the 
requirements of reason for the sake of these requirements alone and thereby to 
achieve unconditional self-determination in one’s willing. This praise is followed by 
what we now call the Empty Formalism Objection. Kant is faulted for turning his 
important insight into a one-sided position, absolutising the moral standpoint. 
Doing so lands one with an empty formalism for the following reasons: 
 
From this point of view, no immanent doctrine of duties 
[Pflichtenlehre] is possible. One might indeed bring in material from 
outside and thereby arrive at particular duties, but it is impossible to 
make the transition to the determination of particular duties from the 
above determination of duty as absence of contradiction, as formal 
correspondence with itself, which is no different from the specification 
of abstract indeterminacy; and even if such a particular content for 
action is taken into consideration, there is no criterion within the 
principle for deciding whether or not this content is a duty. On the 
Fabian Freyenhagen 
Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 
97 
contrary, it is possible to justify any wrong or immoral mode of 
action by this means. — Kant’s further form — the capacity of an 
action to be envisaged as universal maxim — does yield a more concrete 
representation [Vorstellung] of the situation in question, but it does 
not in itself [für sich] contain any principle apart from formal identity 
and that absence of contradiction already referred to. — The fact that 
no property is present is in itself no more contradictory than is the 
non-existence of this or that individual people, family, etc., or the 
complete absence of human life. But if it is already established and 
presupposed that property and human life should exist and be 
respected, then it is a contradiction to commit theft or murder; […]. 
But if a duty is to be willed merely as a duty and not because of its 
content, it is a formal identity which necessarily excludes every 
content and determination. (PR §135R; translation modified). 
 
This passage contains a whole barrage of criticisms.
1
 While I will return to some of 
the more specific points later, it is useful here to distil the main elements of this 
passage, and I propose that it boils down to three general claims:  
 
1. No immanent doctrine of duties: it is not possible to arrive at a 
doctrine of duties on the basis of the mere idea of duty for 
duty’s sake or the formal identity of rational willing proposed 
in the categorical imperative. 
 
2. No criterion for testing potential duties: even if candidate duties 
are provided from the outside, testing for whether there is 
consistency in rational willing (or for whether they can be 
willed as a universal law) does not provide a criterion for 
determining whether or not the candidate duties are genuine 
duties. 
 
3. False positives: immoral acts could successfully pass the test for 
consistency in rational willing and the maxims involved could 
be universalised.
2
 
 
These three criticisms are interconnected. For example, criticism 3 is a way of 
amplifying criticism 2: testing for consistency of rational willing is not just useless 
(as criticism 2 has it), but even dangerous.
 3
 Also, as the discussion of these three 
criticisms will show, they form a kind of dialectic, with one leading to the other by 
way of certain Kantian replies.  
Recent Kantian Replies to the Empty Formalism Objection 
Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 
98 
 The criticisms are meant to be immanent ones — Hegel is trying to show 
how the Kantian position is problematic on its own terms and implodes when fully 
thought through (although it can also be rescued to some extent by being sublated 
in Hegel’s own position). Hence, Kantians will have to recognise themselves in the 
characterisation offered. While I will suggest later that Hegel might well be accused 
of presenting an incomplete picture, the basic characterisation that has gone into 
the three criticisms above seems correct. Specifically, Kantians would have a hard 
time denying that the moral law, as Kant thinks of it, consists in a merely formal 
requirement of reason. It is crucial to Kant’s argument that, if there can be a moral 
law at all, it has to exclude all empirical ends and cannot be a ‘material principle’, 
since neither such ends, nor material principles have the required universality and 
necessity for lawfulness (G 4: 399-402, 419-421; KpV especially 5: 21-28). Hence, if 
there can be a moral law at all, then it must be formal in the sense of neither relying 
on empirical ends nor being a material principle. As such, it can only consist in the 
very idea of lawfulness itself — that is, in demanding that rational willing is 
consistent with itself and that one’s subjective principle of action (one’s maxim) can 
be willed to be a universal law. In short, Hegel latches onto the key move in Kant’s 
argument for the categorical imperative, specifically the formula of universal law.
4
 
Moreover, Kantians would also accept that all human action requires specific ends 
and guidance. Kant repeatedly admits that all actions are directed at ends (G 4: 427; 
MS, 6: 384f; see also KpV 5: 34) and our (lower-level) maxims involve specific 
content and specific ends, or at least specific action types done for specific types of 
ends (such as making false promises as a way to promote one’s interests, or 
committing suicide when one expects more suffering than happiness from living 
on). Hence, the problem of empty formalism cannot be simply side-stepped by 
denying the background assumptions which lead to it. 
 Instead, Kantians have to tackle this problem head on. In what follows, I will 
discuss (what I take to be) the best contemporary defences against each of the three 
claims made by Hegel.  
 
II. Kantian reply strategies  
 
II.1 An immanent doctrine of duties 
It is a controversial issue how, if at all, duties are derived within Kant’s moral 
philosophy and what role, if any, the categorical imperative plays in this. I cannot 
here do justice to all the different interpretations. Instead, I concentrate on the 
three most promising avenues: (a) a side-stepping manoeuvre based on ascribing 
moral realism to Kant; (b) a reply that concedes that an immanent doctrine of 
duties is not possible, but denies that it was Kant’s intention to provide one; and (c) 
a final, more elaborate defence, according to which there is a sense in which Kant’s 
ethics does contain an immanent doctrine of duties after all. 
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II.1a 
One recent suggestion has it that Kant is a moral realist who takes our moral duties 
as given, so that he neither needs nor attempts to offer a doctrine or derivation of 
duties.
5
 On this view, the categorical imperative is only meant to be a useful tool to 
counteract our tendency to rationalise away the fact that a specific moral duty 
applies to us,
6
 and its defence in Part III of the Groundwork is only concerned with 
assuring us of the obligatory nature of moral duties for finite rational beings like us.  
Insofar as Hegel is commonly read as a moral realist himself,
7
 this 
interpretation of Kant’s ethics would mean that there is actually no disagreement 
between Hegel and Kant when it comes to the impossibility of offering a doctrine 
of duties on the basis of the mere idea of duty for duty’s sake. Moral realist or not, 
Hegel would simply have misunderstood Kant, although the Empty Formalism 
Objection might still be applicable to what we nowadays describe as Kantian 
constructivism (which is a form of moral anti-realism) as well as to any attempts to 
derive specific duties from this perspective. Moreover, perhaps Hegel’s first 
criticism could be recast so as to put in doubt the usefulness of the categorical 
imperative for counteracting our attempts to rationalise away our obligations — 
this, however, would effectively collapse it into the second criticism (to which I 
return below in II.2). In this way, the overall thrust of Hegel’s first criticism would 
have been sidestepped or at least diverted.    
 
II.1b 
Those who want to keep more distance from both Hegel and moral realism have to 
offer alternative strategies of reply. A familiar first move is to insist that the 
Groundwork should not be understood to do any more than it claims to: and that is 
to clarify and ground the highest principle of morality (G 4: 392). In the preface to 
this work, Kant states that he is not concerned with the application of the moral 
law (and thereby, one presumes, not concerned with arguing for or deriving specific 
duties). Such application would be the work of ‘practical anthropology’, not the 
‘metaphysics of morals’ and even less of the preliminary study of its foundations (G 
4: 388; see also 412; MS, 6: 217). In this sense, the examples of duties discussed in the 
Groundwork are just illustrations in the process of clarifying the highest principle of 
morality, not actually derivations of specific duties (such as the duty not to make 
false promises as a way to promote one’s interests, or the duty to not commit 
suicide when one expects more suffering than happiness if one carries on living). 
Kant takes it to be uncontroversial that the duties used in the examples are accepted 
as ‘actual duties’ (G 4: 424) — no derivation is necessary to show this. He also 
accepts as given the customary division into self- and other-regarding duties of 
either a perfect or imperfect kind (G 4: 421; see also 423f), reserving his right to 
revise it later (G 4: 421n). The closest Kant comes to offering arguments for specific 
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(ethical) duties is in the second part of the Metaphysics of Morals, the Doctrine of 
Virtue (Tugendlehre) (about which more below).  
However, this first move merely shifts the problem, since the real question is 
not so much whether or not Kant attempts to provide or derive an immanent 
doctrine of duties in this or that book, but whether his moral philosophy has the 
resources to do so. One response to this question is to concede that if what is at 
issue is the possibility of deriving a doctrine of duty from the mere idea of duty for 
duty’s sake, then Kant does not attempt it and in any case cannot provide it (nor 
could anyone else). Still, this concession does not damage Kant’s ethics, since he 
does not attempt to offer an immanent doctrine of duties. In fact, Kant would 
himself reject such an immanent doctrine as misconceived — unless we bring in 
knowledge about human beings, their needs and vulnerabilities, a doctrine of duties 
for human beings cannot be provided, and that is why such a doctrine and the 
specific duties we face fall within practical anthropology, not metaphysics of 
morals. Actually, even the discussion of specific duties in the Metaphysics of Morals is 
merely due to the fact that ‘a metaphysics of morals cannot dispense with principles 
of application and we shall often have to take as our object the particular nature of 
human beings, which is cognised only by experience, in order to show in it what 
can be inferred from universal moral principles’ (MS, 6: 217; emphasis in the 
original). In other words, the specific duties discussed in the Doctrine of Virtue are 
not derived merely from the idea of duty for duty’s sake, but owe their existence to 
practical anthropology.
8
 
If one adopts this response strategy, then the decisive disagreement with 
Hegel is whether or not his second criticism is correct — that is, whether or not the 
mere idea of duty for duty’s sake, and thereby the categorical imperative, contains a 
criterion for testing maxims. The first criticism is correct as far as it goes, but it 
does not go far at all, since Kant was well aware that this mere idea did not contain 
a doctrine of duties. Before discussing the second criticism, one additional response 
to the first requires our attention.  
 
II.1c 
A third strategy of reply is similar to the second, but less concessive. It consists in 
emphasising that some content and even some duties (albeit general) are contained 
in the mere idea of duty for duty’s sake, and that, although anthropological 
knowledge and perhaps even sociology are required to derive more specific duties 
from this content, this idea frames this derivation and, in this sense, Kant’s ethics 
contains an immanent doctrine of duties. Part of this defence relies on the thought 
that the very concept of duty only makes sense as applied to finite rational creatures 
and that, hence, knowledge about human beings (as finite rational creatures) is 
admissible, at least as long as it is merely descriptive and no normative ideas other 
than the form of the moral law (or, what comes to the same thing, the mere idea of 
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duty for duty’s sake) is appealed to.9 In this sense, even the anthropological (and 
sociological) knowledge invoked is not really outside material — only other 
normative ideas, or substantive duties would be. Also, for the most general 
elements of the doctrine of duties even such knowledge would not be required: we 
can derive some content from the mere idea of duty for duty’s sake, specifically the 
objective end of humanity.  
To substantiate this response, it is useful to begin by noting how Kant 
actually proceeds in the Doctrine of Virtue to arrive at the specific duties he puts 
forward. What is striking is that the formula of universal law, which Hegel seems to 
have in mind when making his Empty Formalism Objection, does not figure 
prominently. Instead, the formula of humanity features repeatedly in the 
reasoning,
10
 as does the idea of two obligatory ends, the perfection of oneself and 
the happiness of others (on which more below). Insofar as humanity as an end in 
itself is an objective end contained in the idea of the categorical imperative itself and 
insofar as the two obligatory ends follow from this idea (at least in conjunction 
with some anthropological knowledge), Hegel’s first claim could be rebutted and it 
could be shown that there is a doctrine of duties immanent in the mere idea of duty 
for duty’s sake, after all. These are complex issues, so my discussion of them here is 
going to be a high-altitude sketch only.  
 
Objective and obligatory ends 
The key move in the transition to the formula of humanity in the Groundwork is 
the connection between the idea of the moral law and the will of a fully rational 
being (G 4: 426). Kant extends his analysis of what is involved in rational willing 
beyond what he has already said about it in Parts I and II, suggesting that all willing 
is directed towards ends (G 4: 427). However, since we are looking at rational 
willing as such, the ends in question cannot be empirical ends, from which, as we 
have already seen, the moral law is supposedly independent. Rather, we need to 
consider whether there are any ends which ‘hold equally for all rational beings’ (G 
4: 427). Such ends would be what Kant calls ‘objective ends’. They are analytically 
differentiated from subjective ends, that is, the particular ends for the sake of which 
finite subjects actually act, although in practice it can happen that a particular 
subject makes an objective end into his or her subjective end. Kant’s formal 
principle of morality, the categorical imperative, has only to abstract from 
subjective (and thereby contingent) ends, but not from objective (and thereby 
necessary) ends.  
 In the Groundwork, Kant argues that humanity is an objective end. (By 
humanity he understands the rational nature of human beings, that is, their capacity 
for rational and autonomous willing).
11
 The argument for this, in a nutshell, is the 
following (see, especially, G 4: 427f, 435, 437f, 440): If there is anything of absolute 
worth (that is, unconditional goodness), then it is an objective end, an end that 
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holds for all rational beings. The only thing of absolute worth is a good will. (This 
premise is taken from Part I of the Groundwork (see 4:393f); and Hegel would 
presumably grant its truth for argument’s sake within his immanent critique of 
Kant’s ethics). The capacity for autonomous willing is required for a good will, 
since a good will is a will which aims at morality for moral reasons, and such 
reasons cannot be based on inclinations, since the latter are — by (their) nature — 
orientated towards self-love, which can differ from and even conflict with morality 
(G Part I and 4: 444; KpV 5: 22-27, 33ff). In fact, the capacity for autonomy is 
required for a good will, not as an independent pre-condition, but constitutively (G 
4: 444) — willing autonomously consists of willing what is absolutely good, and vice 
versa. Consequently, the capacity for autonomy is an objective end, and, as the idea 
of humanity consists in this capacity, humanity is an objective end.
12
 As such, we 
have to treat humanity in all our action always as an end in itself, not merely as a 
means — and that is exactly what the Formula of Humanity requires. 
 The problem facing Hegel is that Kant seems here to be doing exactly what 
Hegel denies is possible: to derive some content from the mere idea of good willing 
(which, in the case of human beings, is the same as the mere idea of duty for duty’s 
sake — as Hegel concedes, at least for argument’s sake in PR §§133-5). Admittedly, 
what is derived here is not yet some specific duty but ‘only’ an objective end. Still, 
this objective end plays an important role in generating specific ethical duties in the 
Doctrine of Virtue — for example, the arguments for the duty not to kill or maim 
oneself, the duty to oneself not to lie, and the duty against false humility rest 
centrally and explicitly on the claim that undertaking such acts would be to treat 
humanity in one’s own person as a mere means (MS, 6: 423, 429f, 434-436). 
Similarly, duties to others, such as the duty of respect, are based on the same 
consideration as applied to others: we have a duty of respect because otherwise we 
would be permitted to treat others as mere means and disregard the dignity with 
which their humanity endows them (MS, 6: 462, 466).  
Turning to the two obligatory ends of one’s own perfection and the 
happiness of others, Kant’s argument here too is probably best constructed as 
relying heavily on the formula of humanity, at least in the case of the first 
obligatory end. To say that one’s own perfection is an obligatory end is to say that 
we have a duty to develop and protect our capacities. Specifically, this means that 
we have a duty to preserve our body, to develop our moral capacity to act, to 
cultivate our natural powers and faculties as well as moral predispositions. The 
argument in support of the thesis that this is an obligatory end is an extension of 
the argument that humanity is an end in itself. Thus, if our capacity for autonomy 
is an objective end because it is required for there to be absolute worth, then 
whatever makes this autonomy possible is also an objective end. Protecting and 
developing our capacities is required in order to sustain and actualise autonomy, 
and, hence, our own perfection is obligatory as an end. Admittedly, this judgement 
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relies on some knowledge of human beings — that they are born in such a way that 
their capacities need to be developed, that they have vulnerabilities and needs which 
make it necessary to protect their capacities, and so on. Still, the knowledge 
required here is of a very general nature and, at least in part, just an extension of the 
very idea of a finite, embodied rational agent. 
Why is the perfection of others not also an obligatory end? Well, Kant 
thinks that we cannot directly promote the perfection of others — for perfection 
requires that agents set their own ends in the light of their understanding of duty, 
and no one can do such end-setting for someone else (MS, 6: 386). Still, we can and 
should help others to be in the position to perfect themselves — and this thought 
leads us to the second obligatory end, the happiness of others: since we are sensuous 
creatures, we would have difficulties working towards our own perfection if we 
were unhappy, and to avoid the latter we require the help of others.  
If the happiness of others is an obligatory end for us, then this means that we 
have the duty to promote the ends of others, at least as long as these ends are 
morally permissible. The argument in Kant’s text builds more on the idea of the 
formula of universal law and thereby presents an even more direct counterexample 
to Hegel.
13
 If I take the maxim of self-love and test it by way of the categorical 
imperative, then I realise that universalising the maxim requires me to include the 
happiness of others among my ends (MS, 6: 393; see also KpV 5: 34). I can only 
rationally will to promote my own happiness, if I also accept the happiness of 
others as a reason for action.
14
 One might think that it follows from this that we 
have a general duty to promote everybody’s happiness, including our own. 
However, for Kant it cannot be a duty to do something that we are going to do 
anyway, independently of our having a duty to do it. Consequently, promoting 
one’s own happiness cannot be a duty, since it is an end every human being has ‘by 
virtue of the impulses of his nature’ (MS, 6: 385f; see also 387, 451). Thus, we 
naturally tend to promote our own happiness anyway, but this is permissible only 
if we are willing to promote other people’s happiness, too.15 Hence, the happiness 
of others is an obligatory end for us and so is the duty to promote their ends 
(subject to the constraint that the ends they pursue to attain happiness are morally 
permissible ends). Again, it is just certain general facts about human nature (such as 
that they naturally seek their own happiness) play a role in this argument. 
Kant uses these two obligatory ends to derive some of our more specific 
ethical duties in the Doctrine of Virtue, particularly the duty to search one’s 
conscience, the duties to develop and increase one’s natural and moral perfection, 
the duties of beneficence, and the duty to oneself regarding non-rational beings (see 
especially MS, 6: 441, 443, 445-447, 451-453). To take the latter as an example, Kant 
argues that we have a duty not to destroy natural beauty wantonly and not to be 
cruel to animals because doing either of these acts weakens or undercuts our work 
towards moral perfection. Specifically, it blunts dispositions that are important for 
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morality, such as, presumably, our sensitivity to the suffering of sensuous creatures, 
which human beings are, after all, as well.
16
  
Insofar as both obligatory ends are clearly linked to the categorical 
imperative, this imperative frames the derivation of duties, while it is not by itself 
sufficient for the purpose of deriving specific duties. Instead, we need to draw on 
the specific nature of human beings and their circumstances — that they have needs 
which they require the help of others to satisfy, that they interact in various ways, 
that their capacities need to develop, that they are vulnerable, that they naturally 
seek happiness (the satisfaction of their desires), etc. Nonetheless, no purported or 
candidate duties are brought to the derivation from the outside, nor any other 
normative ideas beyond what is contained in the concepts of duty for duty’s sake, 
good will, and rational beings with wills. In this sense, one could argue that Kant’s 
ethics contains an immanent doctrine of duties. While based on a formal principle 
of morality, it is not devoid of moral content, but includes a way to derive specific 
duties by reference to this principle and the general facts about human beings 
relevant to its application — or, at least, this is what Kantians would argue.17 
 There are various ways in which Hegel or Hegelians might respond to these 
arguments, such as doubting the Kantian thesis that moral reasons cannot be based 
on inclinations.
18
 Instead of following up the wider debate between Kantians and 
Hegelians that such a challenge to a key Kantian premise would entail, I want to 
take up a more direct Hegelian rejoinder. Even if Hegelians were to accept for 
argument’s sake that some ends can be derived from fairly minimal premises within 
Kant’s ethics, they would argue that the ends in questions are too general and vague 
to get to the kind of specific duties and guidance that would be required for actual 
ethical practice.
19
 What it is to respect another person will vary enormously from 
one age to the next and from one society to the next — it will be different in twelfth 
century Japanese society and twenty-first century Sweden, and it will be different in 
contemporary Cairo and contemporary Kaliningrad. Similarly, the duty to help 
those in need will vary enormously with context, notably with institutional 
context.
20
 Is there a state-run and coercively enforced redistributive mechanism in 
place to help those in need? If so, does the duty to help others extend merely to 
compliance with this mechanism or go beyond it? Are there perhaps two duties 
here (one to comply with just institutions and one of charity)? And what if there is 
no such mechanism or one that is problematic in various ways? Will not the duty 
to help those in need change quite fundamentally in this different context? And if 
so, in what way are we still talking of one and the same duty that is merely applied 
differently in different contexts?  
 In reply, Kantians might begin by conceding some element of contextuality, 
although they would probably maintain that this is really only an application 
issue.
21
 It might well be true that what it is to treat someone with respect and as end 
in itself will vary from one age to the next and from one society to another, but the 
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general duty of respect is invariant, and any differences are just about specifying its 
detailed implications or the practical rules of implementing it. Also, Kantians 
would present the following counter-argument to the Hegelians. If one makes 
moral norms and duties too context-specific, one opens the floodgates to relativism 
and, perhaps more importantly for a Hegelian, one cannot demonstrate that the 
specific practices and institutions are rational. To avoid this, we have to be able to 
show how the specific moral duties fit with the demands of reason — and the 
categorical imperative is meant to show just this. It brings out the choice-worthy 
aspects of maxims (and practices), and without it, we fall into either dogmatism or 
relativism — neither of which are suitable for Hegel’s aim of rational reconciliation. 
As Ameriks puts it: 
 
the crucial point here is that his superior concreteness can be a real 
advantage only if the content is correct. At this point, rather than 
lapsing into social relativism, as he is too often still charged with 
having done, Hegel tends to fall back on bounds set by pure morality: 
our commitment to Sittlichkeit is to be restrained by a Kantian respect 
for man as an end in himself. In this way Hegel can properly criticise 
ancient slave culture as well as the similarly objectionable Sittlichkeit 
of some modern societies, but only at the price of relying on what 
seem to be the very abstract principles he meant to transcend. 
(Ameriks 2000: 314)  
 
In sum, Kantians are happy enough to concede that we need what Herman has 
called ‘middle theory’ — which includes not just general anthropological knowledge 
but also knowledge about the particular social context — in order to arrive at 
specific duties.
22
 Still, if we gave up on framing this derivation of duties by the 
categorical imperative (and the objective and obligatory ends), then we would give 
up on rational grounding altogether.  
 At this point, Hegelians respond by arguing that the categorical imperative 
does precious little work in the actual derivation of duties. Instead, when Kant in 
his time and Kantians nowadays say that they derive duties, they in fact just fall 
back on the ethical life that surrounds them (or the remnants thereof).
23
 Rather 
than holding social practices to an independent critical standard, they, perhaps 
unwittingly, rely on contextually given norms and turn into defenders or, at most, 
reformers of the status quo (as they see it). Presumably, this reassertion of the basic 
objection is partly due to the fact that Hegelians think that the categorical 
imperative does not actually provide a workable criterion with which to test 
maxims or candidate duties. And in this way the debate about the first criticism by 
Hegel merges with the debate about his second criticism, to which I will now turn.  
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II.2 A criterion for testing the candidate duties 
Kant suggests at one point that an important function of the categorical imperative 
is to counteract our tendency to rationalise our past behaviour and future actions in 
such a way as to let us get away with breaches of what we — at least in the abstract 
— already know is morally wrong (G 4: 405). The categorical imperative can do this 
counteracting work because we can use it to test our maxims and, presumably, also 
any purported duty in order to determine whether or not they are genuinely 
morally permissible or required. It would thus be a serious blow if Hegel were right 
that the categorical imperative is unsuitable for this purpose because it does not 
actually contain a criterion that rules in genuine maxims (and candidate duties) and 
rules out the problematic ones. Moreover, it would be a blow to Kantians, 
whichever of the three reply strategies sketched above they adopt. 
 Hegel’s criticism is specifically directed against the formula of universal law, 
that is, the categorical imperative to ‘[a]ct only on that maxim through which you 
can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’ (G 4: 421). In effect, 
Hegel says that this formula does not go beyond the mere idea of duty as the lack of 
contradiction. There is truth in this assertion insofar as Kant would presumably 
admit that the formula of universal law is about whether or not one can will 
without contradiction that one’s maxim become universal law. Specifically, for Kant, 
there are two kinds of cases of contradiction at stake: (a) one cannot will the maxim 
to be a universal law because its universalisation cannot be conceptualised (that is, 
there is what is nowadays called a ‘contradiction in conception’); or (b) the maxim 
is conceivable as universal law, but its universalisation can still not be willed by 
rational beings (that is, there is ‘a contradiction in willing’).24 A strict duty is one 
where universalising a maxim that was contrary to it generates a contradiction in 
conception, while a wide duty is one where universalising a maxim contrary to it 
would avoid this problem but instead generate a contradiction in willing.
25
  
 Hegel does not discuss contradiction in willing, perhaps because he thinks 
that if the contradiction in conception test fails, the whole enterprise is doomed — 
after all, strict duties would then not be accounted for. What he does discuss (and 
repeatedly so) is a variant of the false promising example from the Critique of 
Practical Reason, the Deposit Example (KpV 5: 27; see PS ¶437; PR §135R). In this 
example, Kant imagines that someone has placed a deposit with another person but 
has subsequently died and left no record of it. For the person with the deposit, this 
would be an occasion to act on the maxim ‘to increase my wealth by every safe 
means’, but this person might test whether or not this is a permissible maxim by 
asking whether or not the maxim could be willed as a universal law. Kant says it 
could not be so willed, since in a world where it was a universal law that people did 
not return unrecorded deposits when it is safe to keep them, ‘there would be no 
deposits at all’ (KpV 5: 27) or at least no unrecorded ones. One might object here to 
specific aspects of the example or to Kant’s reasoning, but Hegel presses a deeper 
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point: without the premise that property is a morally permissible institution and 
theft morally problematic, the mere fact that someone does not return a deposit to 
his or her owners (or to the heirs) cannot be shown to be morally problematic, for 
there is nothing with which this act or the underlying maxim could come into 
contradiction. To recall the passage from the Philosophy of Right, not denying the 
right to existence of a particular group, nor rejecting such a right for humanity as 
whole, nor abolishing the institution of property leads to a contradiction, unless we 
have already assumed what would need to be demonstrated: that we have a duty to 
preserve or at least not endanger human life and a duty to respect people’s 
property. Without these presuppositions, neither a contradiction in conception, 
nor a contradiction in willing could be generated. 
 In reply, Kantians could argue that the Hegelian worry is misconceived. 
Specifically, Hegel seems to assume that we would first need to show that 
promising or property are justifiable institutions in order to show that acting 
contrary to them is morally problematic, but this is beside the point because what 
is at issue is a contradiction in conception, not a contradiction in willing (where the 
rational acceptability of institutions might play a role). The contradiction in the 
case of the maxim of false promise-making is that the maxim both relies on the 
existence of an institution (here promise-making) and, if adopted as a universal law, 
makes its existence impossible. This suffices to strike the maxim down, 
independently of the merits or demerits of the institution in question. A 
justification of the institution is neither assumed nor necessary, since the agent, in 
invoking the institution, already accepts it in a sufficient sense: he or she cannot 
both want to use it and undermine the possibility of its existence.
26
 Admittedly, 
such a contradiction does not show that the institution in question (say promise-
making or private property) is morally permissible. Still, showing this is necessary 
in order to defeat the maxim.  
 However, Hegelians could respond by arguing that it is misleading to 
evaluate an institution and the maxim making use of it wholly independently of 
each other — such a strict division of labour is likely to generate (moral) blind 
spots. Basically, the contradiction in conception test might be good at showing that 
free-riding is impermissible, but even if it were good at showing this, it could 
produce the wrong result, since not all free-riding or non-compliance with an 
institution is obviously impermissible. Consider the following example: Under the 
so-called ‘Jim Crow laws’, non-whites were prohibited in many Southern US states 
from sitting in the front seats of buses long into the 1950s. This requirement would 
seem to run counter to the moral egalitarianism of Kant’s ethics — even deserving 
to be resisted by permissible means (such as civil disobedience). Indeed, there were 
black citizens, such as Jackie Robinson in the 1940s or Rosa Parks in the 1950s, 
who decided to oppose this practice by such means, and Kantians would surely 
want to vindicate their behaviour as not just permissible but even admirable. Yet, 
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their behaviour would fail the categorical imperative on at least some descriptions 
of it. Thus, if Jackie Robinson or Rosa Parks had made it their maxim to always sit 
in the front when taking the bus, this maxim would have generated a contradiction 
in conception — we cannot conceive of a world in which everyone acts on this 
maxim, since it is in the nature of buses that they can only accommodate a finite 
number of passengers in the front seats. Testing for a contradiction in conception 
seems to produce here a false negative, that is, it excludes something as a violation 
of a strict duty that is no such violation.
27
  
 Kantians would tend to say that there is something wrong not with the test 
provided by the categorical imperative, but rather with the formulation of the 
maxim — for example, the maxim should not be described as always sitting in the 
front when taking the bus, but as acting against unjust institutions by legally 
permissible means. Still, in order for this reply not to be merely ad hoc, Kantians 
would have to provide clear limits and guidance on maxim formulation, and to do 
so without smuggling in substantive ethical content. In this way, the discussion has 
to move on to what Kantians can reply to Hegel’s third criticism.  
 
II.3 False Positives (and Negatives) 
There is more to Hegel’s third criticism than is betrayed by the brief remark in the 
Philosophy of Right. When we turn to the Phenomenology of Spirit, we can see Hegel 
making a similar point: ‘Just because the criterion [of rational consistency] is a 
tautology, and indifferent to the content, one content is just as acceptable to it as its 
opposite’ (¶430). More specifically, it turns out that the objection here is, at least in 
part, related to what is sometimes called the Act-Description Problem. As Hegel 
argues in the context of the discussion of the Deposit Example (¶437; see KpV 5: 27 
and above), nothing prevents me from stopping to describe the object as deposit or 
the rightful property of someone else and viewing it, instead, as ‘my rightful 
property’ or ‘an unowned object’ — or so Hegel claims: 
 
If I should keep for myself what is entrusted to me, then according to 
the principle I follow in testing laws, which is a tautology, I am not in 
the least guilty of contradiction; for then I no longer look upon it as 
the property of someone else: to hold on to something which I do not 
regard as belonging to someone else is perfectly consistent. Alteration 
of the point of view is not contradiction; for what we are concerned 
with is not the point of view, but the object and content, which ought 
not to be contradictory. Just as I can — as I do when I give something 
away — alter the view that it is my property into the view that it 
belongs to someone else, without becoming guilty of contradiction, so 
I can equally pursue the reverse course. (PS ¶437) 
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The crucial point in this argument is that changing my description of the object in 
question is not contradictory and, hence, not excluded by the testing procedure. In 
this sense, it seems again as if the criterion provided by rational consistency (or 
willing my maxim as universal law without contradiction) is not sufficient as a 
criterion and might not exclude immoral acts and maxims. 
 One way to capture Hegel’s point somewhat differently is to say that Kant 
faces a dilemma when it comes to the input into the test that the categorical 
imperative supposedly provides: if the moral law consists only in the requirement 
that we should not act other than on a maxim that could be a universal law, then 
any maxim can be made to conform to the moral law if suitably described (the Act-
Description Problem);
28
 if, on the other hand, there are constraints on what kinds 
of maxim (or act descriptions) are the right ones to be tested, then Kant’s ethics is 
not formal, but contains substantive constraints after all.
29
 
 It might help to consider an example. A man we might call ‘Eric Cantona’ is 
leaving the football pitch in anger and while walking towards the changing room a 
fan from the opposite team insults him.
30
 Let us grant that kicking the fan in 
response is morally impermissible and see whether the Kantian testing procedure 
tracks this. What if Cantona’s maxim were the following: ‘Whenever I, a French 
Player with the number 7 of the football Club, Manchester United, am insulted by 
the Crystal Palace fan Matthew Simmons on the 25
th
 January 1995 in Crystal 
Palace’s football stadium, I will kick the amassed matter at space x’? Here, it seems 
very difficult, if not impossible, to claim that there is a contradiction in conception 
or in willing — for I can consistently conceive and perhaps even rationally will a 
world where everyone who is the French Player with the number 7 of the football 
Club Manchester United, is permitted to kick the amassed matter at space x when 
they are insulted by the Crystal Palace fan Matthew Simmons on the 25
th
 January 
1995 in Crystal Palace’s football stadium. As there is only going to be — at most — 
a one-off application of this maxim, even if it were universally adopted by 
everyone, it seems that it does not undermine any important institutions or in 
other ways run counter to many of the usual things Kantians say would make 
passing the universalisability test impossible. Moreover, the description is, at once, 
specific and vague, and in such a way that none of the important moral elements 
which one would normally flag up come into view.  
 There are a number of things Kantians say in response to the Act-
Description Problem, not all of which are clearly compatible with each other. I will 
here concentrate on the most important and generally accepted line of response. 
Testing maxims for conformity with the Categorical Imperative is first and 
foremost a test to assess maxims for action from the deliberative, first personal 
perspective (rather than a third-personal assessment of rightness of action). The 
first-personal perspective brings certain constraints on maxim-formulation with it. 
The maxims need to be at least minimally rational, where this means that they must 
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conform to the hypothetical imperatives in question (rules of skill (technical) and 
counsels of prudence (pragmatic)) — otherwise they fail as principles of willing and 
action, quite independently of their moral permissibility. The maxims to be tested 
also have to be those that the agent sincerely believes he or she actually acts on. 
Finally, we are only interested in action-types, not specific acts — that is, we are 
interested in, for example, deception-for-personal gain, not the specific time of day 
this takes place. These three constraints are not substantive in a way that takes 
anything away from the formalism of Kant’s ethics, since they are part of the very 
idea of maxims as subjective principles of action and the particular first-personal use 
to which we put the categorical imperative — if we want to know whether the 
behaviour we intend to undertake and the specific reasons why we undertake it are 
permissible, we had better make sure that we test the relevant maxim, that is, one 
which sincerely describes what we are up to, which involves the required means, 
and which is sufficiently general to allow for whatever specific variation is required 
to then put it into practice. These constraints are not independent moral 
constraints, but constitutive norms for the very process of testing our maxims for 
moral permissibility.
31
 
 Let us return to the Eric Cantona Example and look specifically at the 
second constraint mentioned: sincerity. If the maxim is formulated in such a 
specific way as my example above was — ‘Whenever I, a French Player with the 
number 7 of the football Club Manchester United, am insulted by the Crystal 
Palace fan Matthew Simmons on the 25th January 1995 in Crystal Palace’s football 
stadium, I will kick the amassed matter at space x’ — then it must be part of the 
intention that it stands and falls with this specificity. Thus, Cantona was not 
permitted to kick the Crystal Palace fan on his adopted maxim, if he had just found 
out that he was in fact not French; or if the fan he kicked actually sat on seat y (not 
x); or if he was mistaken about the date he was acting on. Yet, it would seem that 
Cantona would have proceeded to kick the fan, even if he had discovered these 
facts. Hence, it seems that the maxim he ascribed to himself is not the maxim he 
did, in fact, (set to) act upon, as he would have admitted, if pressed. The actual 
sincere maxim would have depended not so much on specific details as the imagined 
one did, and Cantona could have known this. Yet, this means that the imagined one 
was insincere and as such unsuitable for testing it as a maxim for action that he was 
actually going to adopt. In this way, a lot of maxims, which look like they would 
pass the test of the Categorical Imperative because they are too specific or 
idiosyncratic, would be disallowed even before this test is applied.
32
 Consequently, 
a significant first step towards overcoming the Act-Description problem is to 
recognise that the maxims to be tested have to meet the requirement that they are 
sincerely held and instrumentally rational (as well as stated in terms of action-
types).
33
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Moreover, Kantians would also disagree with Hegel’s claim that altering 
one’s point of view (say, from accepting that an object is Smith’s rightful property 
to claiming it as my own rightful property) involves no contradiction in rational 
willing (PS ¶437). After all, at least if I intentionally alter my point of view, then I 
also act on a maxim — say the maxim, ‘Whenever it is to my advantage, I will re-
describe things, actions or maxims so as to make my behaviour and willing appear 
to be compatible with the categorical imperative’. One could argue that this maxim 
would itself not pass the categorical imperative, and to act on it would display 
insincerity not in the practically self-defeating sense of not really testing the maxim 
I genuinely want to act on, but in the direct moral sense of aiming at deception.   
 Still, there is something unsatisfying about the Kantian reply strategy, for the 
problem is not just that the maxim tested was not sincerely held or might have 
involved an impermissible deception strategy, but that — even if it had been 
sincerely held in all its specificity and was not adopted to deceive — the action it 
proposed is morally problematic: assuming that the deposit really ought to be 
returned and that the fan really ought not to be kicked, then this part of it has been 
lost track of in the response considered so far to the Act-Description Problem. The 
categorical imperative would only be suitable to pick up on the second-order 
maxim of deception, but absent such a maxim or insincerity, the presence of either 
too much specificity or too much vagueness (or both) in the description means that 
the testing process would not pick up on the morally salient features and would not 
yield the result of excluding what is morally impermissible and allowing what is 
permissible. Similarly, if we think back to the case of civil disobedience against 
racial segregation, it seems as if the maxim, ‘I will always sit in the front seats when 
taking the bus’ could be sincerely held (and is instrumentally rational and 
formulated in terms of action-types) but would still come out as impermissible on 
that formulation. Also, the more general substitute — acting against unjust practices 
by permissible means — is too abstract to guide us in specific cases — Rosa Parks 
also needs to know whether or not sitting in the front of the bus is one such 
permissible means. In other words, the categorical imperative fails to exclude 
impermissible and to pass permissible actions, unless they are sincerely and 
correctly described in the first place, but doing the latter turns out to be very 
difficult indeed. Often quite natural descriptions will be such that they yield false 
positives or negatives if tested for moral permissibility by way of the categorical 
imperative.  
 Herman suggests a reply to worries such as these when she accepts that 
human beings not only need to know the categorical imperative but also need to be 
educated in rules of moral salience to realise that they are in a moral situation and 
identify the features that require moral deliberation.
34
 This represents a break with 
what Kant says in his more optimistic moments about the categorical imperative: 
namely, it is a break with his claim that everyone could know (or, at least, be 
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assured of) what is morally required of them just in virtue of the compass the 
categorical imperative provides (G 4: 404; see also KpV 5: 27, 35-37).
35
 Still, there 
are other passages where Kant acknowledges that certain sensibilities and the 
capacity of moral judgement are required as background conditions of moral 
agency (MS, 6: 399-402), and in some places he even admits that we require 
experience in sharpening these sensibilities and capacity to judge in order to 
recognise what we have to do in specific situations and be motivated to act 
accordingly (see, most notably, G 4: 389).  
However, if we need rules of moral salience, or moral sensibilities to 
correctly describe the situation and to make correct use of the categorical 
imperative, then one might again question whether the categorical imperative still 
does any useful work. If I have described the situation correctly so as to bring the 
morally salient features into view and I am generally disposed to act morally, then 
why does this not suffice by itself to settle what I have to do? Why do I still need to 
consult the categorical imperative? In fact, many of the paradigm examples of 
morally right behaviour — such as the actions of those who helped Jews to escape 
persecution and death during the Nazi reign — did not involve any appeal to the 
categorical imperative or much reflection at all, but simply the perception of the 
need of others and the danger they were in.
36
 On the other hand, knowledge of and 
appeal to the categorical imperative did not stop people from carrying out some of 
the most paradigmatic evil acts — Eichmann famously claimed to have always tried 
to live according to the requirements of the categorical imperative and quoted it in 
his defence.
37
  
In reply, it could be argued that one reason why testing my maxim by way 
of the categorical imperative might still be required, or, at least, useful is that even if 
I have the morally salient features clearly in view, I might not yet know how to 
adjudicate between them, and the categorical imperative test could help with this 
task, at least once the situation is described correctly. Moreover, as we have 
mentioned already, testing our maxims by way of the categorical imperative is an 
important counterweight to our tendency to rationalise away what we know is 
morally required. Also, the mere fact that the testing procedure has been 
misunderstood and misapplied (as, Kantians would claim, happened in Eichmann’s 
case) does not yet show that it is always useless or dangerous to employ it. And 
Kantians do not claim that we would, in all cases, actually have to go through the 
procedure, but merely that we could and that doing so would normally yield the 
right results — although there is no iron-cast guarantee that it will do so, since the 
proper use of the procedure requires us to have the right kind of practical 
orientation and sensibilities to guide this process.  
Still, even if it were true that the categorical imperative is not completely 
redundant, there are other worries to which this revised view of Kantian ethics 
gives rise. Firstly, if Kant’s optimism is indeed unfounded and has to be given up in 
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the way Herman suggests, the issue of culpability becomes much trickier, since now 
luck plays a much bigger role in whether or not the individual is fully capable of 
describing the situation and using the categorical imperative correctly. There are 
related repercussions, such as the fact that the alleged advantage of the categorical 
imperative over the counsels of prudence — that the requirements of the former, 
but not of the latter, are always ‘quite easily seen and without hesitation by the 
most common understanding’ as well as ‘within everyone’s power at all times’ to 
satisfy — disappears, and with it also goes the reasonableness of the moral demands 
to ‘command compliance from everyone, and indeed the most exact compliance’ 
(KpV 5: 36).
38
  
Secondly, one other important lesson from this discussion is that the earlier 
Kantian argument that the categorical imperative (or the objective end of 
humanity) could and should be used to test for the permissibility of social practices 
is now shown to rest on presuppositions that call the viability of its employment 
for this purpose into question. How could the categorical imperative provide a 
critical standard of this sort, if it actually turned out that using it correctly relied on 
having been brought up to recognise morally salient features? Presumably, if social 
practices are morally problematic, the moral upbringing and education in that 
society may well be problematic too. If so, the purported advantage of abstract 
morality over concrete ethical life — that the former, but not the latter, offers us 
the resources to evaluate our social practices on the basis of a standard independent 
from them — evaporates, at least for those within these practices.39 And if the social 
world contains some non-corrupted normative resources and upbringing after all, 
then no appeal to context-transcendent standards will be required.  
In sum, something of Kant’s enlightenment optimism — the optimism that 
we can all use our own reason unassisted, whatever our upbringing or social context 
— is required to keep the Kantian and Hegelian positions apart, but one could 
reasonably disagree as to the viability of this optimism, and even Kantians seem to 
have given up on it. To close with the boxing analogy with which I started, it seems 
as if the result is a split decision points victory for the Hegelians. 
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Notes 
                                                          
*
 This paper substantially overlaps with my, ‘The Empty Formalism Objection 
Revisited: §135R and recent Kantian responses’, in T. Brooks (ed.) (2011), Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right: Essays on Ethics, Politics, and Law. Oxford: Blackwell. For 
comments and criticisms on earlier drafts, my thanks go to audiences at talks in 
Newcastle, Stirling, and Dublin, as well as at the Hegel Society of Great Britain and 
UK Kant Society 2010 Joint Conference in Oxford. Special thanks are due to Thom 
Brooks, Rowan Cruft, Katerina Deligiorgi, Wayne Martin, David McNeill, Bob 
Stern, Lea Ypi, and the fellow members of the Cambridge Forschungskolloquium 
(Manuel Dries, Martin Eichler, Raymond Geuss, Michael Hampe, Richard 
Raatzsch, Jörg Schaub, and Christian Skirke). 
1
 In fact, Hegel goes on to point to the Phenomenology of Spirit for a discussion of 
further antinomies that the Kantian position gives rise to (PR §135R, referring to 
PS ¶¶596-631). 
2
 One might ask here by what means we are to ascertain that the maxims are 
immoral, given that they purportedly pass the categorical imperative. One way to 
argue here is that Hegel (rightly) takes Kant to be trying to vindicate common sense 
morality, so that it would be a problem, if a maxim that is immoral by the lights of 
common sense would pass the categorical imperative (or if one that was seen as 
permissible failed to pass it). 
3
 One could read Hegel’s passage as entailing the stronger claim that the categorical 
imperative contains no criterion whatsoever, not merely that it contains no criterion 
for testing potential duties. While the text is not conclusive, one downside of this 
stronger reading is that the third criticism would then make little sense — if there is 
no criterion whatsoever, then there is no test and, hence, nothing would pass the 
categorical imperative, not even immoral acts. 
4
 The formula of universal law states: ‘act only in accordance with that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law’ (G 4: 
421; see also 402, 437; KpV 5: 30). 
5
 See, for example, Stern (2009: §III.1), with further references.  
6
 Kant mentions at one point that the categorical imperative has such a 
counteracting function (see G 4: 405). I take this up below (in II.2). 
7
 See, for example, Knowles (2002: 215), with reference to PR §140R; see also Wood 
(1990) and Stern (2007). 
8
 In fact, some commentators think of the Metaphysics of Morals as something more 
like Kant’s practical anthropology and not really a treatise in the metaphysics of 
morals, which would deal mainly or even exclusively with a priori concepts and 
justification (see, for example, Timmermann 2007: Appendix F).  
9
 See, for example, Herman (1993: 122). One possible objection to this strategy, 
which I will not be able to discuss here, is to doubt that the distinction drawn 
between descriptive and normative content is defensible, especially when 
anthropological and sociological knowledge is counted among the former.  
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10
 The formula of humanity states: ‘Act in such a way that you always treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply 
as a means, but always at the same time as an end’ (G 4: 429).  
11
 See, for example, G 4: 439, where Kant directly equates ‘humanity [Menschheit]’ 
with ‘rational nature [vernünftige Natur]’. Thus, by ‘humanity’ Kant means 
something besides the human biological species. For him, humanity consists in the 
capacity to reason and to be moved to action by pure practical reason alone. It is a 
normative ideal, not a mere descriptive category. 
12
 For example, Kant writes that, ‘[a]utonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity 
of human nature and of every rational nature’ (G 4: 436). 
13
 Still, the argument could also be run by way of the formula of humanity — 
presumably, to treat others as ends in themselves includes respecting and promoting 
their (permissible) ends.  
14
 A similar argument might be at the back of Hegel’s mind when he claims that the 
welfare of all is a value for us (see PR §125; see also Knowles 2002: 187-189; 
Knowles does not mention this parallel with Kant). On the sense of rational willing 
at play here, see note 26 below. 
15
 Although we do not have a direct duty to promote our own happiness, Kant 
admits that we have an indirect duty to promote it. If we are unhappy or lack 
means (say, when we are extremely poor), then this may make it difficult or 
impossible to act morally. Hence, we have an indirect duty to avoid pain, adversity, 
and want, since we have a moral duty to preserve our moral agency and integrity 
(MS, 6: 388; see also G 4: 399). This is only indirectly a duty to our own happiness, 
since directly it is a duty to preserve our ‘moral integrity’ (MS, 6: 388). 
16
 It is here not my intention to suggest that this argument is successful or plausible, 
but merely to highlight that the obligatory end of one’s own perfection plays a 
recognisable role in Kant’s and Kantian reasoning. 
17
 See, in particular, Herman (1993 and 2007).  
18
 Hegel is often read to attack the central Kantian idea that morally worthy action 
requires that we do not act from inclination (see, for example, Knowles 2002: 178-
184, with reference to PR §§123-124; see also Rawls 2000: 333, 335). Herman offers 
a reply that emphasises the fact that Kantian autonomy might require only that my 
desires and inclinations are shaped by moral considerations, not that I act without 
or against them (2007: Ch. 1). 
19
 See MacIntyre (1998: 96f). 
20
 The issue of (institutional) context-dependence is at least part of the point of 
Hegel’s discussion of ‘Love thy neighbour as thyself’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
¶425. See also MacIntyre’s discussion of how circumstances change moral concepts 
(1998: Ch. 1, especially 1f) and alter what character traits are counted as virtues or 
vices (ibid.: 206). 
21
 See, for example, Herman (2007: especially Ch. 2); see also Herman (1993: Ch. 4). 
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22
 On middle theory, see Herman (1993: 233-240). It is ‘the translation of a formal 
conception of value into terms suitable for the particular contexts of human action 
and deliberation’ (ibid.: 240).  
23
 See MacIntyre (1998: 191, 197, 207f). 
24
 See, for example, O’Neill (1989); for the textual basis underpinning this 
distinction, see G 4: 424. One common way of thinking about the categorical 
imperative is to ask whether or not we could conceive and rationally will a world 
in which one’s maxim is a natural law governing this world and determining 
human nature (see, for example, Rawls 2000: 168f). This approach takes its lead 
from a variant of the universal law formula, namely, the law of nature formula 
which states that we should ‘act as if the maxim of your action were to become by 
your will a universal law of nature’ (G 4: 421). I will adopt this practice in the 
discussion which follows. 
25
 A comment on ‘rational willing’ might be in order here. What Kant must mean 
by our inability to will the universalisation of a maxim is not something that one 
simply cannot actually will, since there are things that one can actually will that are 
morally problematic (think of Hare’s example of the imaginary Nazi who actually 
wills himself to be killed in the case in which he turns out to be a Jew, or of 
someone who is in such dire straits that he or she would agree to anything in order 
to be fed and housed). Rather, the contradiction in willing test is about what a fully 
rational being would be able to consent to. For this reason and in this sense, I speak 
of ‘rational willing’ here. This should also bring out that rational here is more than 
taking the required means to further one’s long-term self-interest — one can be 
rational in this (weaker) sense and not accept a moral duty to help others in need 
that goes beyond strict mutual advantage. A fully rational being, unlike us finite 
ones, would not be motivated by self-interest, but only by what pure practical 
reason required. To mark the difference from the weaker sense of rationality, some 
Kantians speak of ‘reasonable’ to denote the stronger one (see Rawls 2000: 164f).  
26
 The exact nature of the contradiction is debated among Kantians, with the two 
leading interpretations being that a contradiction in conception is about (a) logical 
contradiction or (b) practical contradiction (acting in such a way as to undermine 
the very possibility of achieving the end one sets out to achieve by so acting). 
Fortunately, we need not enter into this debate here, since the response sketched in 
the main text is open on both interpretations. For further discussion, see Korsgaard 
(1996: Ch. 3); Herman (1993: 136-143). 
27
 There is another objection here, although it is not clear whether it is Hegel’s or 
simply Hegelian (see also Henrich 1994: especially 102f). It is arguably implausible 
to think that the most important reason why physical abuse or torture is wrong is 
that we cannot universalise a maxim that included abuse and torture as an end or 
means. In fact, it is also implausible to think that the only or even the most 
important reason why physical abuse and torture are wrong is that they undermine 
our moral agency. If this is true, then one could argue that contradictions in 
conception or willing are not an adequate test for the (im)permissibility of maxims, 
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since they do not reveal the right reasons why acting on the maxim is wrong. 
Especially on a Kantian picture, it is also those reasons which we want to know 
about and then act on. To Hegel’s credit, he seems to acknowledge that inflicting 
bodily harm is bad in itself (not just in virtue of resting on non-universalisable 
maxims or undermining our moral agency; see PR §48R). Admittedly, if those who 
ascribe moral realism to Kant are correct, then he could accept this too (although 
running the categorical imperative test would still not provide us with knowledge 
of the right reasons why inflicting bodily harm is wrong). 
28
 See also MacIntyre (1998: 197f); and Knowles (2002: 205f). 
29
 Could Kant fall back here on the objective end of humanity and the two 
obligatory ends to provide guidance that is substantive but nonetheless compatible 
with his formalist ethics)? As we see in the main text, Kantians tend to appeal, at 
least in the first instance, to other considerations. Still, as we also see in the main 
text later on in this section, these ends do play a role in a fuller Kantian reply — 
specifically, Herman’s rules of moral salience embody them. 
30
 As they say at the end of film trailers, ‘any resemblance to persons living or dead 
is purely coincidental’. 
31
 Admittedly, we might not test our maxims at all, but this would be a moral 
failing in at least some instances and one which has little to do directly with the 
Act-Description-Problem. Also, we might test the false maxims (for example, we 
might be deceived about our own motives). Kant cannot exclude this. For him, the 
best we can do is to describe the actions and motives as sincerely and accurately as 
possible. The point in this context is that this requirement of sincerity already 
weeds out maxims of the sort that could yield false negatives or positives, and, 
hence, is an important resource in responding to the Act-Description-Problem — or 
so the Kantians argue.  
32
 To repeat, the maxims in question would be ruled out even before testing them 
with the help of the categorical imperative, not because they conflict with 
substantive moral norms imported from the outside, but because they are 
incompatible with the constitutive requirements of acting and wanting to test the 
maxim one intends to act on (as well as the first personal perspective involved in 
this). See also Herman (1993: 75). 
33
 While I have concentrated on false positives, Kantians would argue that the three 
listed requirements of maxim-construction would also rule out the possibility that 
the categorical imperative generates false negatives (such as that it is impermissible 
for Rosa Parks to engage in civil disobedience since her maxim — always sit in the 
front on bus journeys — generates a contradiction in conception). 
34
 (Herman 1993: Ch. 4). See especially the following concession: ‘An agent who 
came to the CI procedure with no knowledge of the moral characteristics of actions 
would be very unlikely to describe his action in a morally appropriate way. Kant’s 
moral agents are not morally naive. In the examples Kant gives of the employment 
of the CI procedure (G[, 4:] 422-423), the agents know the features of their 
proposed actions that raise moral questions before they use the CI to determine 
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their permissibility. It is because they already realise that the actions they want to 
carry out are morally questionable that they test their permissibility. It is hard to 
see how any system of moral judgement which assessed maxims of action could 
work with morally naive or ignorant agents’ (Herman 1993: 75). 
35
 Herman is aware that her proposal ‘does not preserve the idea of a simple 
technique for maxim assessment’, but suggests that this ‘loss (if it is a loss) will be 
more than made up if the CI procedure [that is, testing maxims by way of the 
categorical imperative] can be made to work’ (ibid.: 131).  
36
 See Halter (1998). 
37
 See Arendt (1994: 135f). 
38
 To claim that the purported advantage disappears is not to say that there are no 
other contrasts between the categorical imperative and counsels of prudence that 
might remain.  
39
 Herman suggests that the choice-worthy aspects of maxims to which the 
categorical imperative points us — such as the objective end of humanity — provide 
critical tools with which we can evaluate rules of moral salience from the outside 
(from a practice-transcendent vantage point) (1993: Ch. 4, especially 92). However, 
this is an unconvincing suggestion: if we need sensibility and rules of moral salience 
to make use of the abstract content purportedly generated by the idea of the moral 
law, then this abstract content cannot provide an independent critical check on 
these sensibilities and rules.  
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